This paper contributes to the debate initiated by Gali (1999) . I provide a theory with capital income taxation, labor hoarding as well as long-run shifts in the social attitudes to the work place -modelled as "leisure at the work place" -to argue that there are other shocks that may influence labor productivity in the long run. I introduce "medium-run identification" and show it to be superior to long-run identification or standard short-run identification, when applied to artificial data. With US data and medium-run identification, I find the robust result that technology shocks lead to a humpshaped response of total hours worked, which is mildly positive following a near-zero initial response.
This paper contributes to this debate by re-examining the theoretical foundations for the long-run identification of technology shocks. I argue that labor productivity can be moved in the long run also by changes in dividend taxation as well as changes in the social attitude towards the work place, and not just technological improvements. I introduce a very simple and novel model of labor hoarding as "leisure at the work place" in business cycle theories. Empirically, and as an alternative to longrun identification, I introduce and propose medium-run identification, try it out on artificial data generated by some theories and then apply it to the data. Following Christiano et al (2003) , I do not first-difference hours. In contrast to long-run identification, medium-run identification leads to the fairly robust results, that technology shocks lead to a humpshaped response of total hours worked, which is mildly positive following a near-zero initial response.
2 Long-run Productivity: some theory.
The evidence in Gali (1999) and Ramey (2001, 2003) , that technology shocks lead to a fall in total hours worked comes from estimated VARs, in which technology shocks are identified by the restriction, that they are the only source of long-run stochastic movements in labor productivity. While this can be justified by simple business cycle theories, in which technology has a unit root and technological progress is exogenous, this is difficult to justify more generally. Most obviously, in endogenous growth models, any shock may end up shifting labor productivity in the long run. Here, I shall pursue models with exogenous technological progress, but two other potential sources of changes in long-run labor productivity: dividend taxation as well as long-run shifts in the social attitude towards the work place. Both will lead to short-run movements in opposite directions for labor and labor productivity, which may thus partially explain Gali's (1999) findings. I shall also assume technology to be trend-stationary: technology shocks will not have any long-run impact on any variable, including labor productivity. There only will be a relationship among the various deterministic trends.
Ultimately, it is desirable to provide a model which both accounts for the variety of empirical findings as well as provide a successful explanation of business cycles.
But this is an ambitious goal which has to await future work. The purpose of this section is much more modest. It is to build a workhorse model containing some of the features that may be essential to understanding productivity movements, and with which one can examine the success of econometrically identifying technology shocks, when applied to simulated data. Importantly, our model will have the feature that neither short-run, medium-run nor long-run identification will exactly identify the technology shock: the most one may hope for is to come close.
For dividend taxation, consider figure 1, which shows US tax rates on corporate dividends, obtained from Ellen McGrattan's website. The eyeball impression, that this series is very persistent or even nonstationary can be confirmed by fitting loworder AR processes to this series.
For social attitudes toward the work place, I refer to anecdotal evidence that people increasingly regard the work place as a place for social interaction and a substitute for leisure activities at home. The office has become a place for finding marriage partners, for surfing the Internet, even for enjoying recreational facilities, receiving massages or celebrating a variety of special events. For a number of activities, the boundaries between work and leisure have become increasingly blurred. Is a "power lunch" with another manager lunch or work? What about business trips to destinations, that others might visit as tourists? Accordingly, measured labor input has shifted in permanent ways vis-a-vis actual labor input, resulting in permanent changes in measured labor productivity.
This effect is related to labor hoarding, which has often been proposed as an explanation for why labor productivity may move procyclically, even if production is demand-driven. To exclude the possibility of measuring technology shocks simply by their short-run impact on labor productivity, I will therefore allow for labor hoarding in my theory.
I propose to model labor hoarding as well as the social attitude towards the work place in a very simple (and possibly overly simplistic) way as follows. I assume hours at work to generally exceed actual work hours, and assume that agents regard this extra time spent at work as "leisure at the work place" and a perfect substitute for leisure outside of work. The work-place leisure activities can be adjusted on short notice to allow for the necessity to work more, without changing measured work hours much.
More precisely, I shall assume that contract hours (and thus measured hours) n c,t are the sum of actual work hours n t and work place leisure l n,t , n c,t = n t + l n,t and that wages per contract hour w c,t are calculated precisely such that they correspond to the marginal product of labor w t paid to actual hours worked, w c,t n c,t = w t n t Agents are assumed to be endowed with one unit of time, so total leisure is equal to l t = 1 − n t = l n,t + l h,t , where l h,t is home leisure. I assume that agents care only about total leisure l t , and not the individual components.
With these assumptions, there is no economic force pinning down contract hours.
Contract hours and thus contract labor productivity are simply mismeasurements of true hours worked and true labor productivity. I assume an exogenous process for contract hours by assuming the difference between contract hours and some fixed multiple of actual hours to be closing at a certain speed, subject to shocks, which reflect shifts in the social attitude towards the work place,
where Φ ≥ 1 and η t is an AR(1) process,
To model short-run shifts or long-run shifts, I adjust the value of ρ or the persistence of η t .
Clearly, more economic theory to determine n c,t would be desirable, in order to tie down the degrees of freedom here, or to tie it to more fundamental preference and To complete this model, I consider a standard real business cycle model with labor hoarding as described above, with stochastic shocks to the time endowment (alternatively interpretable as preference shocks) and with an exogenous process for dividend taxes. I assume technology to be persistent, but not with a unit root, and assume dividend taxes to be more persistent than technology. Dividend tax shocks are announced one period in advance. Given dividend taxes and given constant government spending, wage taxes are calculated endogenously to make the government balance its budget period by period.
Formally, preferences are assumed to be
and subject to exogenous preference shocks,
. Wages w t are the marginal product of labor, while dividends d t are the marginal product of capital.
Wage taxes are given by
Capital is accumulated linearly,
I solve for the competitive equilibrium.
As parameters, where t counts years, I choose α = 2/3, θ = 1/3, δ = 0.1, ψ z = 0.95 4 = 0.81, σ z = 0.7 * 2 = 1.4,ḡ/ȳ = 22%,τ k = 25% and thusτ n = 28%, see Cooley and Prescott (1995) or use NIPA averages. Further, I experiment with ψ τ k = 1, σ τ k ∈ {0; 3.3%}, Φ = 1.2, ρ ∈ {0; 0.5; 0.8}, ψ η ∈ {0; 1}, σ η ∈ {2%; 0.1%; 0}, ψ µ = 0.8, σ µ ∈ {0%; 3%} to allow for a variety of artificial economies on which to try out econometric identification of technology shocks.
The impulse response to a technology shock and a dividend tax shock, when labor hoarding is turned off, are shown in table 2. Note that the dividend tax shock is a shock with permanent effect of labor productivity. On impact, labor moves down, and productivity up, since the disincentive to save makes agents reallocate to current consumption of goods and leisure, inducing labor to decline. Since capital is predetermined, productivity moves up. Eventually, productivity declines (and labor rises), Table 2 : Impulse responses, with labor hoarding "turned off ".
as capital is adjusted downwards relative to labor. While this shock has permanent effects on labor productivity, and while it leads to short-run opposite movements in labor and labor productivity, it cannot by itself explain the empirical findings of Gali, since the productivity impulse response changes sign.
Conversely, with persistent preference disturbances and contract disturbances, ψ µ = 0.8, σ µ = 3%, ρ = 0.8, ψ η = 1, σ η = 0.1%, but dividend tax shocks turned off, table 3 shows, how labor hoarding allows this model to generate procyclical measured labor productivity movements in response to preference shocks.
Medium-run identification
The work horse model of the preceeding section can now be used to simulate artificial data and run experiments of econometrically identifying technology shocks. To provide some structure, consider a first-order identified VAR in, say, labor productivity and total hours worked,
fitted to the data. The k-step ahead forecast revision is given by 
and where E jj is the zero matrix, with only the j-th element on the diagonal replaced by 1. With this, one can calculate φ i,j,k = (Σ k,j ) ii /(Σ k ) ii as the fraction of the k-step ahead forecast revision variance for variable i, explained by shock j.
To identify technology shocks, and if one does not wish to estimate some complete structural model like the one of the preceeding section, it is attractive to proceed by ordering labor productivity first, do a Cholesky decomposition of some Σ(k) = C k C k , C k lower triangular, and find some A satisfying C k = B k A as well as Σ(0) = AA (the latter is no restriction, if B is invertible). The first shock (one standard-deviation in size) then has the one-step ahead prediction error given by the first column of A and explains all of the k-step ahead forecast revision of labor productivity. Standard shortrun identification uses k = 0, noting that the one-step ahead prediction error is the 0-step ahead prediction revision in the terminology here. The long-run identification of Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1999) uses k = ∞. In this paper, I propose to consider and use medium-run identification, decomposing Σ k for some suitable Table 4 : Decomposition of k-step ahead forecast error revision variances. Left: σ τ k = 3.3%, ρ = 0.5, ψ η = 0, σ η = 2%, no preference shocks. Right: ψ µ = 0.8, σ µ = 3%, ρ = 0.8, ψ η = 1, σ η = 0.1%, dividend tax shocks turned off. 0 < k < ∞. As an extension, one may wish to focus on sums of Σ k , requiring principal-components analysis, see Uhlig (2003) .
For two parameter specifications of the theory, table 4 plots φ i,j,k and shows that technology shocks contribute most to the variance of productivity forecast revision variances at intermediate horizons of about 3 to 10 years out. Further, there is no horizon, at which technology shocks alone explain labor productivity. Thus, neither short-run, medium-run nor long-run identification will exactly identify the technology shock: the most one may hope for is to come close. Table 5 applies these to artificial data from the specification with persistent preference and contract shocks. Mediumrun identification works better than the other two. In particular, the true technology impulse response of labor is best identified with the medium-run identification scheme.
Similar results, not shown, obtain for other parameter specifications.
Application to the data
With these encouraging results, I apply medium-run identification to US data. I used a Bayesian VAR, and fitted it to annual data provided by Francis and Ramey (2003) k=0 k=4 k=20
Prod. Table 6 : Impulse responses, postwar data. VAR in labor productivity, level labor and dividend tax rates. Shown are the median response as well as the 16% and the 86% quantiles.
for private sector labor productivity and total hours worked (divided by the popu- regardless of the data set used.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have shed light on the debate of whether technology shocks lead to a fall in total hours worked, following up on the debate initiated by Gali (1999) . I first provided a theory with capital income taxation, labor hoarding as well as long-run shifts in the social attitudes to the work place to argue that there are other shocks that may influence labor productivity in the long run. In doing so, I have provided a novel way of modelling labor hoarding as "leisure at the work place".
I introduced "medium-run identification", applied it to artificial data generated from theory and compared it both to long-run identification as in Gali (1999) and standard short-run Cholesky decompositions. According to the theory, neither shortrun, medium-run nor long-run identification will exactly identify the technology shock: the most one may hope for is to come close. I find that medium-run identification gets closest to replicating the true impulse response of total hours worked to a technology shock.
Applying it to data, I find that medium-run identification provides more robust results in a three-variable VAR in labor productivity, level labor and dividend taxes than long-run identification. According to my estimates, I find that technology shocks lead to a humpshaped response of total hours worked, which is mildly positive following a near-zero initial response.
